Fair Trade-Variable Price Contracts and the Non-Signer Clause by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 2 Article 18
Fall 9-1-1972
Fair Trade-Variable Price Contracts and the Non-
Signer Clause
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Commercial Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fair Trade-Variable Price Contracts and the Non-Signer Clause, 29 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 456 (1972),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol29/iss2/18
456 WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
FAIR TRADE-VARIABLE PRICE CONTRACTS
AND THE NON-SIGNER CLAUSE
In 1931, during this country's severest depression, California became
the first state to enact a Fair Trade Law.' This was the result of pressure
brought upon the legislature by independent retailers seeking resale price
maintenance to protect against loss of business resulting from an increas-
ing number of successful chain stores.2 The California law,3 as originally
written, was found to be almost totally ineffective, however, since few
retailers were willing to bind themselves to fair trade prices without assur-
ances that competing firms were also bound.' Thus, in 1933 a "non-
signer" clause was added to the California statute to enable the contract-
ing parties to enforce the fixed price against others who were not signato-
ries to the agreement.5 Other states followed the lead of California and
in 1936 the United States Supreme Court,' in a suit against a non-signer,
held that the Illinois Fair Trade Law 7 was not violative of due process.
8
The following year Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Act' expressly
'CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16900-05 (West 1964). For background and historical
material concerning fair trade laws generally, see Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact
and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967 (1955); Weston, Resale Price Maintenance, 33 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST SECTION 76 (1967); Comment, Fair Trade: The Ideal and Reality, 27 OHIO ST.
L.J. 144 (1966); Comment, Resale Price Maintenance: The Nature and Validity of Fair
Trade Laws, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 307. A good capsule history is given by the court in General
Elec. Co. v. S. Klein-on-the-Square, Inc., 121 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
2See Comment, Fair Trade: The Ideal and Reality, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 144, 147 (1966);
Comment, Resale Price Maintenance: The Nature and Validity of Fair Trade Laws. 1967
U. ILL. L.F. 307, 308.
'CAL. Bus. & Prof. Code .§ 16900-05 (West 1964).
4Comment, Resale Price Maintenance: The Nature and Validity of Fair Trade Laws.
1967 U. ILL. L.F. 307.
5CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16904 (West 1964). The California statute is typical of
the clause still in existence today and reads:
Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any
commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into
pursuant to this chapter, whether the person so advertising, offering for
sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition
and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby.
Id.
'Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
'ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 6, §§ 188-91 (Smith-Hurd 1960).
'In addition to the due process question, the court stated that the Illinois law was not
violative of equal protection, was not an unlawful delegation of power to private persons
and that the terms "fair and open competition" and "any commodity" were not vague and
uncertain. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
915 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Following the Sherman Act statement that "[elvery contract
• . . in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be illegal," the Miller-Tydings Act adds:
NOTES AND COMMENTS
exempting vertical price fixing agreements"0 entered into under state fair
trade laws from Sherman Act prohibitions."
In 1951, however, the Supreme Court in Schwegmann Brothers v.
Calvert Distillers Corp.2 held that under Miller-Tydings state fair trade
laws would not apply to non-signers as to goods sold in interstate com-
merce. Congressional reaction to this decision was immediate, and in
1952 Congress passed the McGuire Act"3 to validate state laws as they
applied to non-signers and interstate sales." Federal court approval
quickly followed."s Although forty-six states eventually enacted fair trade
laws, 6 and forty still have such legislation, only twenty-eight now con-
sider the law valid under their state constitutions." At present, only fif-
teen of these twenty-eight states permit enforcement of fair trade con-
tracts against non-signers."
Notwithstanding the apparent legality of the non-signer clause in
these fifteen states, non-signers continue to question the validity of fair
trade contracts when enforcement is sought against them. In the recent
case of Black & Decker Manufacturing Co. v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 9 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the trial court in deciding
that Black & Decker's contract was unenforceable against the defendant,
a non-signer, since it did not provide for a fixed price below which the
Provided, [t]hat nothing contained in section 1-7 of this title shall render
illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale
of a commodity which bears . . . the trademark, brand, or name of the
producer . . . and which is in free and open competition . . . when con-
tracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate
transactions, under any statute. . . in effect in any State ....
Id.
"°Vertical price-fixing agreements are those between a manufacturer or producer on one
hand, and a wholesaler or retailer on the other. This type of agreement is permitted by the
fair trade laws. Horizontal agreements, which are still not allowed, are those between
producers, between wholesalers, or between retailers.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
12341 U.S. 384 (1951).
115 U.S.C. 45(a)(2)-(5) (1970).
"Id. at §.§ 45(a)(2)-(3).
5Schwegmann Bros. v. Eli Lilly Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
856 (1953). The Supreme Court later upheld the Act in Hudson Distrib., Inc. v. Eli Lilly
Co., 377 U.S. 386 (1964).
1"2 TRADE REG. REP. 6041. Alaska, Missouri, Texas and Vermont have never enacted
fair trade laws. Id. at 6017.
"For a complete breakdown of the state laws see 2 TRADE REG. REP. 6041.
"2 TRADE REG. REP. 6041. The fifteen states considering the non-signer clause consti-
tutional are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia
and Wisconsin. Id.
"15 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 73,806 at 91,413 (Mass. Jan. 14, 1972).
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goods could not be sold. Although the Massachusetts court had ruled
earlier that fair trade agreements were constitutional and enforceable
against non-signers, 21 this case was distinguished because of an additional
provision in the contract allowing a cash discount, not exceeding three
percent of the minimum retail selling price, to be given under certain
conditions. 21 The Massachusetts law2 2 provides that a contract will not be
in restraint of trade when it contains a provision "[tihat the buyer will
not resell such commodity except at the price stipulated by the vendor." 3
The plaintiffs contract, the court reasoned, did not comply with the law
because it authorized each retailer, at his sole option, to vary the price
of any article by as much as three percent.2 ' With this decision the Massa-
chusetts court *becomes the first to identify the "variable price" contract.
In examining whether this type of pricing will be incorporated into the
fair trade laws, the initial question becomes whether the federal enabling
legislation?5 precludes variable price contracts.
The Miller-Tydings Act,26 as the first piece of enabling legislation,
provides for contracts or agreements prescribing "minimum" prices for
resale. In Schwegmannzr the Supreme Court held that the Louisiana Fair
Trade Law?' was not authorized by Miller-Tydings since Louisiana law
sanctioned the fixing of maximum as well as minimum prices.29 The court
went on to point out that the exemption granted by the Miller-Tydings
Act is a limited immunity and that when the bill was being considered
by Congress, the idea of allowing conditions other than a minimum price
was rejected, the provision being restricted to agreements prescribing
2Shulton, Inc. v. Consumer Value Stores, Inc., 352 Mass. 605, 227 N.E.2d 482 (1967);
Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Elm Farm Foods Co., 337 Mass. 665, 148 N.E.2d 861 (1958);
General Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 333 Mass. 665, 132 N.E.2d 652 (1956).
2The conditions contained in the contract were:
(1) The discount must be in the form of cash, trading stamps, coupons,
cash register receipts or analogous form. (2) The discounts must be given
as a matter of the Retailer's general policy and not on Black and Decker
products alone. (3) Black and Decker products must continue to be adver-
tised and offered for sale at the minimum retail price as set out in this
Schedule. . . .(4) The discount should not be given solely for the purpose
of selling trade marked Black and Decker products below the established
minimum retail price.
5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 91 73,806, at 91,414.
2MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, §§ 14 A-D (1967).
21Id. at § 14A(l).
z15 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 91 73,806, at 91,414-15.
215 U.S.C. §§ 1,45(a)(2)-(5) (1970).
-15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
-341 U.S. 384 (1951); text accompanying note 12 supra.
2
8LA. REV. STAT. §§ 51:391-95 (1950).
"341 U.S. at 388. See History and Source of Law annotation accompanying LA. REv.
STAT. § 51:392 (1950).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
minimum prices only."0 Thus, after Schwegmann, it is evident that
Miller-Tydings, without more, would not permit variable price contracts
to be enforced.
The McGuire Act, 31 as the second enabling provision, added an au-
thorization for the "stipulated price" in addition to providing for enforce-
ment against non-signers and thus allows a contract or agreement to
prescribe minimum or stipulated prices for the resale of a commodity.
The variable price contract was not discussed in the committee hearings
for the McGuire Act, and after hearing arguments concerning the pro-
posed legislation in general,32 the Senate Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce reported the bill without recommendation.3 If the
Supreme Court should consider the validity of variable price agreements,
there seems to be no reason supplied by the legislative history of the
McGuire Act to hold them invalid. However, with the Schwegmann
decision as precedent for a strict construction of the enabling acts and
similar reasoning in United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,3 vari-
able pricing could be rejected.
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, applying Tennessee law, allowed
a contract permitting a discount to be enforced against a non-signer,3
1341 U.S. at 388, 393.
3115 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)-(5) (1970).
3the arguments before the Senate Committee tended to strike a balance between
opponents and proponents, e.g., the contention that it "hogties" competition at the retail
level was met with the proposition that price cutting is one of the strongest forces that can
be used to develop a monopoly and fair trade would stimulate competition among manufac-
turers making possible lower prices on quality merchandise.
The reference to the method of pricing was limited to concern of opponents that the
addition of stipulated prices would give producers too much control, while proponents were
interested in being sure only minimum prices could be fixed with no limit being placed on
the maximum that could be charged. S. REP. No. 1741, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1951), 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2181 (1952).
=S. Rep. No. 1741, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1951), 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2181 (1952).
-351 U.S. 305 (1956). While this case involved a question of whether the contracts
were vertical or horizontal, rather than the way goods were priced, the Supreme Court
reviewed both the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts and in rejecting a request for liberal
interpretation of the Acts said:
Congress has marked the limitations beyond which price fixing cannot go.
We are not only bound by those limitations but we are bound to construe
them strictly, since resale price maintenance is a privilege restrictive of a
free economy.
Id. at 316.
uShulton, Inc. v. Hogue & Knott, Inc., 364 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1966). The contract
allowed discounts up to three percent of the retail price as a concession in the form of a
cash discount, trading stamps, cash register receipts or other devices. Shulton, Inc. has had
the 3% variable contract in force since 1964. 364 F.2d at 766.
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despite the provision in the Tennessee Code that the price be "stipulated
by the vendor."36 The court reasoned that since the McGuire Act permit-
ted "minimum or stipulated" prices to be fixed by the vendor,37 the
contract could be enforced against a non-signer. However, since at no
point in the decision does the court refer to the discount provision as a
variable price agreement, it seems that the rationale must have been that
the provision in the contract was just another form of setting a minimum
price. Regardless of this semantic discrepancy, it appears the Sixth Cir-
cuit deems variable pricing to be within the intended scope of the
McGuire Act.
Assuming the Supreme Court would hold that the enabling legislation
does not preclude variable pricing, either by equating this technique with
setting a minimum price or otherwise, the question arises whether the
practice would be permitted in an interpretation of the applicable state
law.38 Of the fifteen states whose nonsigner clauses have been held consti-
tutional, 9 the fair trade laws in six" provide an exemption for price
fixing at "the price stipulated by the vendor." The remaining nine,4 on
the other hand, permit price controls at "the minimum price stipulated
by the vendor." Of the six absolute price states, a question similar to that
of variable pricing has been considered only in Tennessee by the Sixth
Circuit as discussed above." Although Tennessee law was being inter-
preted, the court apparently did not consider that the state legislature had
chosen absolute wording. Thus, it is not clear that variable pricing would
be recognized as valid if tested in the Tennessee state courts. With the
recent restrictive interpretation of the Massachusetts absolute language
in Black & Decker, it seems reasonable to assume that the remaining
absolute states might very well follow the strict interpretation approach
of the court and refuse to enforce a variable price contract against a non-
uTENN. CODE ANN. § 69-201 (1955).
3715 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4) (1970).
38The Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts allow vertical price fixing agreements only if
they are permitted by the legislature of the individual states. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,45(a)(2)-
(5) (1970).
3 Note 18 supra.
'
0Id. These six are Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee and
Wisconsin.
'11d. These nine states are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio and Virginia. The reporter includes Arizona in the list
with those states having a "minimum" price statute although the wording of the section is
the same as in the "absolute" price states and it apparently should be considered with them.
See ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1422(A) (1967). Maine's statute provides for a minimum
price; however, the statute has not been tested as to the constitutionality of the non-signer




The question has been considered in the minimum price states only
by the Rhode Island Supreme Court," which held that by allowing a three
percent reduction from the fair trade price, a manufacturer did not waive
his right to enforce fair trade contracts against nonsigners. 5 While this
decision provides no assurance that variable pricing would fare better in
other minimum states, it seems the variable concept is likely to be ac-
cepted in these jurisdictions since variable pricing may, in fact, be just
another form of setting minimum prices.
While the variable price contract may be disallowed in absolute states
and accepted in minimum states, a further consideration is whether either
group of states should allow this type contract to be enforced against a
non-contracting party. To arrive at an answer to this question, a compari-
son of the need for variable price contracts with additional burdens placed
on non-signers is required. The need for this type of agreement has
unquestionably been the result of demands by those retailers" who were
willing to enter into fair trade contracts. The desire of these merchants
to create shopping incentives in the form of trading stamps and similar
devices is evidenced by the popularity of these modern forms of business
competition, which have been permitted under the fair trade laws of
twenty-two states .4 These merchandising methods were mentioned in a
finding by the Rhode Island court in Shulton, Inc. v. Apex, Inc.," where
it was recognized that the three percent provision in Shulton's contract
was made to accommodate the use of trading stamps, discounts and other
similar devices. 9 In addition, the Sixth Circuit in Shulton, Inc. v. Hogue
& Knott, Inc." recognized that the variable price provision was adopted
43This is especially true in Wisconsin where price concessions are not permitted by a
separate statute. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.15(a) (1957). The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
however, has approved an agreement allowing a special price for quarts or fifths of brandy
sold in three bottle lots, holding that this gave reasonable notice of contract prices to non-
signer retailers of brandy. Fromm & Sichel, Inc. v. Ray's Brookfield, Inc., 33 Wis. 2d 98,
146 N.W.2d 447 (1966).
"Shulton, Inc. v. Apex, Inc., 103 R.I. 131, 235 A.2d 88 (1967). Rhode Island has since
repealed its Fair Trade Law. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 6-12-1 (Supp. 1971). See text accom-
panying note 74 infra.
41235 A.2d at 90.
"Comment, Resale Price Maintenance: The Nature and Validity of Fair Trade Laws,
1967 U. ILL. L.F. 307.
112 TRADE REG. REP. 6047.
"Note 44 supra.
"Ohio has provided by statute for concessions in the form of "trading stamps or other
redeemable certificates, when the amount or value of such allowance does not exceed three
percent of such stipulated minimum resale price." OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.32 (Bald-
win 1971).
'364 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1966).
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to make allowance for the fact that trading stamps had become a way of
life in supermarket merchandising. Indeed, in 1968 the number of outlets
licensed to use the green stamps of Sperry & Hutchinson Co. alone was
70,000, with more than 35 million American households saving those
stamps.5 It is apparent, then, that the benefits of variable pricing, if not
outweighed by the burdens placed on non-signers, suggest the conclusion
that the variable concept should be an integral part of the fair trade laws.
Generally, before a non-signer can be held to have violated the unfair
competition provisions of fair trade laws, it must be shown that he had
knowledge of a fair trade contract and of the price established by that
contract for the commodity he sells. 52 The significant wording in the
typical statutory provision is that the violation be "willfully and know-
ingly" committed. 3 The courts, however, have been inconsistent in their
interpretation of the term "knowledge." 54 In New York, for example, a
court has said that "it is well established law that the act requires no
particular form of notice" and indicated that the only necessity was that
the retailer know the goods were fair traded and the particular price to
be charged."5 In Rhode Island," on the other hand, the court'reasoned
that the non-signer should be sent an actual copy of the contract or price
list. In addition, some jurisdictions require that the knowledge be present
only before the resale of the commodity,57 while in others the party seek-
ing to enforce the contract is usually compelled to demonstrate that the
non-signer had knowledge of the fair trade prices before he acquired the
goods. In the latter jurisdictions the claim of lack of knowledge before
the goods were purchased has been held an affirmative defense, with the
burden placed on the non-signer to prove this fact.59 While there seem to
be inherent burdens on non-signers as shown in the above discussion,
51Sperry & Hutchinson Co. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. IU 18,449 at
20,774 (FTC 1968).
522 TRADE REG. REP. T 6280.
31d. at 6264. Virginia and Ohio are two exceptions since both by statute require that
actual notice be given to the non-signer if he is to be bound to the contract. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 59.1-2 (Repl. Vol. 1968); OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.30 (Baldwin 1971).
52 TRADE REG. REP. 6250.
uRevlon, Inc. v. Janel Sales Corp., 198 N.Y.S.2d 359 at 360-61 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
5"Milady Brassiere & Corset Co., Inc. v. Zwetchkenbaum, 1962 Trade Cas. '1 70,434
at 76,739-40 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 28, 1962).
57Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Goldman, 255 Wis. 69, 37 N.W.2d 859 at 862 (1949),
Barron Motor, Inc. v. May's Drug Stores, Inc., 227 Iowa 1344, 291 N.W. 152 at 154 (1940).
-"See, e.g., James Heddon's Sons v. Callender, 29 F. Supp. 579, 580 (D. Minn. 1939);
Kinsey Distilling Sales Co. v. Foremost Liquor Stores, Inc., 15 Ill. 2d 182, 154 N.E.2d 290,
295 (1958); Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d 304, 308
(1954); Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. J. W. Mays, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 952, 161 N.E.2d 223, 224,
190 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1014 (1959). See generally 2 TRADE REG. REP. U 6252.
5"Seagram Distillers Co. v. Armanetti, 19 III. App. 2d 575, 154 N.E.2d 866 (1958).
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albeit in varying degrees, the courts have apparently not thought them
to be of great weight since they have consistently enforced absolute and
minimum prices on these non-contracting parties.
With the addition of the variable price contract, different problems
with the knowledge requirement may arise since these contracts contain
other conditions, such as the discount itself, the fact that the discount
given must be on all the retailers goods, not just fair trade items, and that
the commodity fair traded must be advertised without the discount being
shown. In New York the manufacturer apparently would not be able to*
rely on mere knowledge of the existence of the contract and the prices
established, but would be required to show that the non-signer also knew
of all the conditions in the agreement" before he acquired the goods. 2 In
Rhode Island this problem probably would not arise since knowledge is
established only when the non-signer is furnished a copy of the con-
tract. 3 Thus, with a variable price contract, at least in states accepting
the New York view, demonstrating knowledge may involve a more de-
tailed notice procedure. It would seem, however, that this would increase
the burden on the producer instead of the non-signer. 4 In addition, it
would seem the non-signer would have a greater possibility of showing
lack of knowledge of all the pertinent provisions of a variable contract
when he claimed this fact as an affirmative defense. In any event, it is
clear that once the non-contracting party has adequate knowledge of the
requirements of the variable contract, there is no greater burden on him
than upon the contracting retailer.
Assuming the need for variable pricing to complement modem mer-
chandising methods, it seems the courts should liberally construe the
applicable statutes to provide enforcement of variable price contracts
where it can be shown that the non-signer had adequtae knowledge of all
the provisions of the agreement. In addition, state legislatures should
amend the applicable law to permit variable pricing with an established
minimum6 and include new and more rigorous notice requirements to
4See, e.g., note 21 supra.
O'See text accompanying note 55 supra.
nCluett, Peabody & Co. v. J. W. Mays, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 952, 161 N.E.2d 223, 190
N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1959).
83See text accompanying note 56 supra.
"For example, some fair traders have adopted the practice of affixing to quotations,
invoices, or the commodity itself, a notice that the commodity is the subject of an estab-
lished fair trade price. With the variable contract the need to disclose all the conditions
might make these methods impracticable. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 1 6250.
"See text accompanying note 59 supra.
c"Jantzen, Inc. v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Here the court
refused to enforce a contract permitting use of trading stamps which did not specify the
number which might be given with the sale of the fair-traded item. In this contract, the court
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insure that the non-signer has adequate knowledge before he can be
bound.67
Although fair trade laws are still viable in twenty-eight states 8 and
enforceable against non-signers in fifteen of those states,69 there is support
for the theory that the trend is toward doing away with the practice
altogether." The idea finds a basis in the conjecture that since the reasons
for the law that grew out of the depression years no longer exist, the lav
should be retired.7' In addition, it is claimed that manufacturers have
other means at their disposal to achieve brand name protection, a goal
which is most frequently cited as the reason for their willingness to partic-
ipate in fair trade contracts. 71 Such means include franchise operations,
selective refusals to sell to habitual price cutters, direct selling to the
customer, consignment selling, and vertical integration with retail out-
lets.7 3 Evidence of the trend is that Mississippi and Rhode Island re-
pealed their acts in 1970, following the example of Nevada in 1965,
Hawaii and Kansas in 1963, and Nebraska in 1959. 71 In other states, the
statute is strictly construed so as to limit its effectiveness, as is demon-
strated by the Massachusetts court in Black & Decker.
75
Since variable price contracts should give recognition to changing
times and merchandising methods, seemingly without placing a burden
on non-signers, adjustments in the law are needed. Also, in the interim
period before state legislatures act, it would seem desirable for state
courts to liberally construe present statutory provisions so that they com-
said, there was no price stipulated within the requirements of the New York Fair Trade
Law.
uSee note 53 supra, stating that the Ohio and Virginia legislatures have already taken
steps to provide specific notice requirements.
"2 TRADE REG. REP. 91 6041. Where contracts are not enforceable against non-signers,
their effectiveness is severely limited.
"9Note 18 supra.
7 For an article on the impending demise of the entire concept of resale price mainte-
nance, see Note, The Impending Demise of Resale Price Maintenance, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q.
68. See also Weston, Resale Price Maintenance, 33 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 76 (1967);
Comment, Resale Price Maintenance: The Nature and Validity of Fair Trade Laws, 1967
U. ILL. L.F. 307; Comment, The Nonsigner Provision Past and Present, 47 ORE. L. REv.
80 (1967).
"Note, The Impending Demise of Resale Price Maintenance, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 68,
78.
72See Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance. 22 U. CHIi.
L. REV. 825, 835 (1958); Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. LAW
& ECON. 86, 104-05 (1960).
"Comment, Resale Price Maintenance: The Nature and Validity of Fair Trade Laws,
1967 U. ILL. L.F. 307, 317 n. 79.
742 TRADE REG. REP. 1 6041.
755 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 91 73,806 at 91,414-15.
